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Young1 
Social and economic rights (SER) adjudication is an ever more common 
feature of rights-protecting democracies. Yet democratic concerns continue 
to be expressed: the threat of a judicialized politics, a politicized judiciary, 
co-opted claimants, distorted markets, and other (real and imagined) chal-
lenges. These concerns are raised within jurisdictions that have not yet 
entrenched SER and those in which SER are explicitly justiciable. Scholars 
seeking to address, or at least quiet, such concerns often explore the real-
world examples of SER justiciability in South Africa, India, Colombia, 
Brazil, Argentina and other jurisdictions discussed in this book. Another 
approach is to examine new ways of theorizing the models of democratic 
representation and separation of powers implicit in these criticisms and to 
test these new models against comparative experience. This chapter exam-
ines the promise of the approach of "democratic experimentalism". 
"Democratic experimentalism" has been advanced as a new paradigm of 
institutional thinking about democracy and law. Scholars of democratic 
experimentalism envision different roles for legal actors, including courts. 
Under this paradigm, courts depart from their traditional model of adjudica-
tive finality, and seek to stimulate deliberative processes that involve parties 
and other interested groups in the design and implementation of legal rights. 
Certain features of contemporary SER jurisprudence indicate the promise of 
a deliberative model, although whether the deliberations contemplated are 
in line with democratic experimentalist proposals is less certain. 
This chapter explores whether the democratic experimentalist approach 
succeeds in delivering a realizable, democratic model for SER adjudication. 
We begin by cataloguing the typical critiques of SER adjudication and then . 
describe how democratic experimentalism, read sympathetically, responds 
to each. Next we apply these responses to the Mazibuko right-to-water case in 
South Africa2 and imagine an alternative approach to that case. Our thought 
experiment is meant to bring the pros and cons of democratic experimental-
ist thinking into sharp relief. While it is important as a program for securing 
more democratic participation in SER adjudication, we examine how 
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democratic experimentalism might nevertheless entail significant costs fo 
unde~-resourced, unorganized and politically weak claimants. This raises th: 
~uestion whether any new procedural or remedial formats for SER adjudica-
tion can help to realize such rights without a fundamental rethinking of th 
material preconditions of democracy itself. e 
Despite some success in SER adjudication in South Africa and elsewhere 
within the last two decades (Young 2012; O'Connell 2012; Gauri and Brinks 
2008), several concerns persist. These are usually presented in institutional 
terms. Rights to food, water, healthcare, housing and education are notori-
ously open~ended, even when circumscribed by the targeted language of 
qualified, conditional legal guarantees. 3 SER adjudication is also procedur-
ally difficult, at least according to an uncomplicated model of the separation 
of powers. When treated as formally enforceable rules, SER appear to 
replace democratic debate with rigid commands; when provision is made 
for more flexibility, SER adjudication may lead to unpredictable and poten-
tially arbitrary judicial interventions. Under the separation-of-powers model 
of three mutually accountable branches of government, SER therefore raise 
the challenge of judicial usurpation and abdication: courts may either 
enforce such rights and thereby usurp the elected branches, or refuse to 
enfor~e, t?ereby abdic~ting their role (Michelman 2008: 683). Civil society 
orgamzat10ns and social movements may also be disempowered by the 
encounter with courts concerning the definition and implementation of SER 
(Brand 2005: 17-36). 
M~~y c.oncerns about SER adjudication map onto concerns about public 
law litigation generally (Chayes 1976: 1281). Lawsuits challenging SER law 
and policy are likely to be complex and amorphous. Water delivery, for 
~xample, involves myriad city, state and nationwide governmental institu-
tions and traverses water, but also health, environmental and finance 
bureaucracies. It engages public and private organizations involved in infra-
structure, maintenance, quality assessment, delivery, and conservation, and 
consumers of water include firms and households with varied requirements. 
The pressures of fact-finding, the marshalling of evidence and its careful 
evaluation may burden the procedural rules and resources of courts. The 
remedial. exercise, conceived not as compensation for past wrongs but as 
prospective changes to public law and policy, transforms the court into the 
role of legislator/policy-maker, for which it is apparently not equipped 
(Chayes 1976: 1315). Because these disputes are polycentric in nature and 
effect, the interests of a multitude and ultimately indeterminate number of 
unre~rese~ted4 absente.es ~ay be greatly affected without their input or 
consideration. Remedies will not reach all parties; yet precedents will bind 
them whether the claims are brought by an individual or by a class. 
Adjudicating social and economic rights 239 
Even with generous standing rules, complainants with water, food, hous-
ing, education or healthcare needs are likely to struggle to access the 
resources, time and expertise necessary to litigate. Public interest organiza-
tions' ability to reach out to and represent these constituencies is perennially 
stretched. The more complex remedies requiring negotiation and engage-
ment call for additional resources and organization. These constraints may 
result in a "middle-class bias" in SER adjudication, reflected in lopsided 
development of precedent and unbalanced access to relief (Ferraz 2011: 
1643; White 2000: 1667; Landau 2012:191; Alviar, this volume). 
Moreover, successful litigation may provoke long-term political and 
cultural backlash and motivate counter-movements that pursue their own 
rights-based agendas (Post and Siegel 2007: 373), as occurred in response to 
the reproductive rights or anti-discrimination strategies in the US (Siegel 
2006: 1323). Once courts are utilized as forums of social struggle, counter-
roovements may induce long-term changes to rights interpretation by shift-
ing the political orientation of judicial appointments. 
These problems coalesce into an overarching concern: that SER adjudica-
tion is anti-democratic and inconsistent with traditional institutions of constitu-
tional democracy. Does giving courts power to resolve fundamental disputes 
about social goods and services threaten the vibrancy and the stability of 
democracy? Leaving to one side the ideal of democracy that such a view enter-
tains,5 it is clear that concerns about SER adjudication are primarily institu-
tional; they reflect disquiet about funnelling democratic activity into courts and 
limiting democratic activity elsewhere. Several democracy-based approaches 
respond by attempting to imagine more accountable and yet dialogical roles 
for courts. "Democratic experimentalism" is one such approach. 
Democratic experimentalism is a collection of pragmatist-inspired proposals 
for fostering more deliberative, democratic institutions. Although not 
conceived as a program for SER adjudication per se, its suggestions for 
bringing institutions and stakeholders together to negotiate and coordinate 
solutions in areas as diverse as community policing, environmental stand-
ard-setting, and drug treatment orders (Fung 2004; Dorf 2003: 875; 
Karkkainen 2002: 189) appear suited to the concerns catalogued above. 
Experimentalism suggests an entirely new architecture for governing -
reflected in the alternative terminology of "new governance" (De Burca and 
Scott 2006: 31) - but we focus on particular applications to adjudication. In 
applying the tools of democratic experimentalism to adjudication in general 
and SER in particular, we are necessarily engaged in an act of interpretation 
and extension of democratic experimentalist ideas. We begin with an 
account of the program before embarking upon a critique. 
The open-endedness of SER adjudication is neither surprising nor unwel-
come to democratic experimentalists; it merely presents another opportunity 
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for int~rested parti~s ~o ~elib~ra~e over provi~ional solutions. For experi-
mentalists, SER adjudication mv1tes democratic engagement, deliberatio 
and lear~i~g about w~at claimants and others care most about in terms :r 
the prov1s10n for social goods. The assumption is that when people a 
. h h re 
uncertam ow t eir goals will be served or their institutions affected, the 
may entertain a more open, collaborative form of decision-making and by 
more willing to reform or even reject the status quo (Sabel and Simon 2004~ 
1074-5). . 
For example, under experimentalist adjudication, a conflict over interpre-
tations of the right to housing might require state officials, claimants, and 
other stakeholders to negotiate over provisional benchmarks or standards 
for security of rental tenure, rental prices, emergency housing facilities or 
~vailable shelter pl~ces. Similarly, the adequacy of the right to water might 
mvolve a contestation over water quotas, quality, access to taps and water 
payment assistance. By including new forms of knowledge - local, situated) 
as well as expert - experimentalists hope that negotiations will expose partic-
ipants to alternative ways of perceiving and responding to social problems) 
draw established participants out of their "comfort zone" (Dorf and Sabel 
1998: 418) and unearth new solutions to such intractable problems as hous-
ing shortages and water scarcity. 
A court engaging in experimentalist adjudication would oversee these 
negotiations and work to ensure the fairness of the deliberative procedures 
and the representativeness of the parties (Sturm and Scott 2006: 565). Within 
this conception, the role of courts is neither simply to safeguard representa-
tive politics nor to reorganize institutions on the basis of substantive consti-
tutional rights, as traditional constitutional theory would have it, "but to 
require that problem-solvers themselves make policy with express reference 
to both constitutional and relevant policy reasons" (Cohen and Sabel 1997: 
335). Sabel and Simon (2004: 1016) argue that a democratic experimentalist 
court could also lend its institutional power to "destabilize" entrenched posi-
tions, especially those of state officials or bureaucracies previously immune 
from electoral accountability or the exposure of litigation. This conception 
sees SER as "destabilization rights" rather than formal entitlements: that is, 
they serve to "protect the citizen's interest in breaking open the large-scale 
organizations or the extended areas of social practice that remain closed to 
the destabilizing effects of ordinary conflict and thereby sustain insulated 
hierarchies of power and advantage" (Unger 1987: 530, endorsed by Sabel 
and Simon 2004: 1055-6). 
The democratic experimentalist approach de-centers courts and takes 
greater notice of institutional innovations occurring elsewhere (Lobel 2004: 
382). Decentralized, collaborative decision-making is the democratic exper-
imentalist's preferred modality of resolving rights conflicts and meeting the 
obligations imposed by constitutional rights; courts are considered too 
remote from the dynamics of such problems to generate satisfactory resolu-
tions through standard adjudicative techniques. Yet litigation is nonetheless 
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important because courts can promote the goals of accountability and trans-
parencYi, and push beyond the traditional model of separation of powers by 
using novel remedial powers to initiate complex reforms (Sabel and Simon 
2004: 1080). Polycentricity is transformed from a challenge to an aid to 
problem-solving because proliferating connections between stakeholders 
generates opportunities for learning and innovation. Judicial intervention 
can also make structural reforms in and across policy areas and institutions 
a plausible prospect. The court's main contribution is "to indicate publicly 
that the status quo is illegitimate and cannot continue" (ibid. 1056). The 
parties, through their induced negotiation, do the rest. 
Democratic experimentalism adds new approaches to the existing 
responses to the problem of unrepresented absentees, such as class actions 
and amici curiae (Chayes 1976: 1300-1). Having the court oversee negotia-
tions between the parties in reaching its decision or in designing a remedy is 
an additional and growing feature of public law litigation in a number of 
jurisdictions (Chayes 1976: 1312; Parmar and Wahi 2011: 172-4; Angel-Caba 
and Lovera, this volume; Gargarella, this volume). Democratic experimen-
talists would also include additional stakeholders in that negotiation, beyond 
the parties themselves (Sabel and Simon 2004: 1098). Within this model, 
remedies are formulated in provisional terms and designed to be renegoti-
ated over time. The critical element of the remedy, then, is the participatory 
process that it establishes. New affected interests may be identified in the 
course of implementation, and these additional constituencies are given an 
opportunity to challenge the provisional standards or pathways that had 
been set through using "rolling" remedies or timelines for reporting back 
and "benchmarking" improvements (ibid. 1069). 
This iterative approach to remedies also applies to rights. Not tethered by 
"rights essentialism" (Levinson 1999: 858) and the need to formulate the 
fixed content of rights, courts make liability determinations in fluid interde-
pendence with the initiation of the remedy. This insight reflects the general 
pragmatist orientation of democratic experimentalism, which does not draw 
a sharp distinction between ends and means but instead emphasizes their 
"reciprocal determination" (Dorf and Sabel 1998: 284-5; Simon 2004: 127). 
However, the position is not wholly fluid. When confronted by a potentially 
serious threat to fundamental rights calling for urgent intervention, experi-
mentalists propose that courts lay down "prophylactic rules" as a preventive 
or protective measure while inviting actors close to the situation to develop 
improvements on these general rules through deliberative experimentation 
{Dorf and Sabel 1998: 453). Such rules have presumptive force "until experi-
ence provides a better alternative" (ibid. 457). 
For its proponents, this approach is consistent with both public and 
private law (Sabel and Simon 2004: 1062). It is also compatible with market-
based solutions insofar as experimentalism rejects the "command and 
control" features of the state's (court, legislative or executive) articulation of 
rights and instead celebrates reciprocal involvement of private actors {Young 
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2012: 265; Lobel 2004: 369). To this extent the experimentalist program 
parallels the Hayekian emphasis on market flexibility and choice as opposed 
t? central planning (Cohen 2010: 369). Yet in contrast to neoliberal deregula-
tion, democratic experimentalists envisage an alternative model that 
purports to deepen democracy and accountability in non-governmental and 
governmental sites while responding to the need for flexible responses and 
market participation (Cohen and Sabel 1997: 315-16). 
Similarly, democratic experimentalism addresses the challenges that SER 
adjudication presents for democracy by introducing a more radical, delibera-
tive version of democracy. Democracy is reimagined as polyarchy - the rule of 
multiple, highly participatory minorities. 6 Experimentalists therefore favor 
direct democracy, emphasizing the benefits of decision-making at the lowest 
possible level rather than through proxies established by representative democ-
racy. Under this approach, different localities are coordinated by procedures of 
information sharing, peer review, and benchmarking of best practices. This 
opening and sharing of information is said to counteract the dangers of localism 
by making former prejudices transparent and exposing them to challenge. New 
solutions designed by particular groups are benchmarked for wider use, and 
incentives are created to encourage other groups to reap the same rewards. 
In summary, an experimentalist approach may bring flexibility, accounta-
bility, and a direct form of democracy to the practice of adjudication, features 
that appear critical to meeting the challenges of SER adjudication. These 
innovations are meant to play a role in both the liability and the remedial 
phases of adjudication. How they might operate in practice is explored below. 
Democratic exipein.:ntle1ri'Ul1.lism: a thought 
South Africa's developing SER jurisprudence exhibits features that reflect a 
dialogic, deliberative approach to adjudication. The Constitutional Court 
has developed an open-ended, flexible model of "reasonableness review" 
that purports to provide scope for the other arms of government to design 
social legislation and programs, while reserving for the court the powers of 
review against specified criteria. Such criteria include, for example, a failure 
by the government to provide for those in urgent need, lack of reasonable 
flexibility in a program, and unfair exclusion of groups from social programs 
(Liebenberg 2010: chapter 4). Based on these criteria, the Court in 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom7 provided an open-
ended declaration of unconstitutionality in order to prompt reform of the 
national housing policy to cater to emergency housing situations. In Minister 
of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign8 the Constitutional Court mandated 
access to the anti-retroviral drug Nevirapine while expressly reserving the 
right for government to adapt its policy if equally appropriate or better 
methods became available for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission 
of HIV.9 
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Most significantly for interventions aimed at stimulating deliberative 
responses, the Constitutional Court in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea 
Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v. City of Johannesburg0 designated 
"meaningful engagement" - between parties, stakeholders and government -
as a weighty factor in determining whether a court should order the eviction 
of people from their homes and how to mitigate the disruptive consequences 
of lawful evictions (see Liebenberg 2012: l; Chenwi, this volume).11 This 
development perhaps reflects the greatest congruence between South African 
jurisprudence and the directly democratic, small-scale and deliberative solu-
tions prescribed by democratic experimentalism (Ray 2009: 799). However, 
meaningful engagement has largely been deployed in eviction cases and 
contemplates involvement of the primary parties, namely the occupiers, land-
owner and/ or local authority. It has not yet been extended to the broad range 
of stakeholders contemplated in the experimentalist approach, although the 
Constitutional Court has signaled the important role of civil society organiza-
tions in facilitating the engagement process.12 Despite its potential to evolve 
into a collaborative, directly deliberative decision-making process between 
citizens, government and private parties (Muller 2012: 300), meaningful 
engagement still vests considerable decision-making authority in state institu-
tions.13 Finally, meaningful engagement has thus far served primarily as a 
dispute-resolution mechanism, not a vehicle for enabling inclusive deliberations 
regarding the far-reaching structural reforms needed to realize various SER. 
In this section, we apply the democratic experimentalist conception of 
courts as deliberative partners in SER realization to one of the Constitutional 
Court's most controversial SER judgments, Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg. 
While this judgment has attracted some support from commentators sympa-
thetic to the administrative burdens on local government within the context 
of water scarcity (Kotze 2010: 157-60), many commentators have suggested 
that the Court was overly deferential to the elected branches of government 
and neglected. to engage with the substantive obligations imposed on local 
authorities by the right of access to sufficient water in section 27 of the 
Constitution (see Liebenberg 2010: 466-80; Williams 2010: 141; Quinot 
2010: 124-36; Wilson and Dugard 2012: 231-6). We explore in the Mazibuko 
context how a democratic experimentalist approach seeks to transform the 
traditional dichotomy between a "deferential" and "usurping" court (discussed 
by Michelman 2008). 
Mazi,buko emerged from changes to Johannesburg's water policy limiting the 
supply of free basic water (FBW) to 6 kilolitres per household (based on the 
national prescribed minimum basic water supply14) and requiring the installaw 
tion of pre-payment water meters as a precondition for water supply in resi-
dents' houses (as opposed to a credit system for in-house service or outdoor 
delivery through yard standpipes). Five households from Phiri, Soweto, chal-
lenged the new policies as contrary to the constitutional right to access suffi-
cient water.15 These claimants, all from very low-income households and 
many with critical care or health based needs for water consumption,16 argued 
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that the supply of FBW was insufficient to meet daily water requirements a d 
that the combined effect of the limited FBW amount and the pre-pay~e:t 
water meter system was that the claimants were frequently left without ace 
t t . d h Th d ess o wa er .m1 . -mont . ey argue further that the policy was unreasonable 
~ecaus~ 1t did not cater to different household sizes, 17 shared water connec-
tions, different consumption needs, and fixed water-borne sanitation require-
ments. A second challenge claimed that automatic termination of a household>s 
water supply beyond the FBW minimum unless additional credits were 
purchased and loaded on the pre-payment meter deprived the applicants of 
procedural fairness. 
The ci~'~ respo~se highlighted problems of sustainable water manage-
ment. This 1s a particular challenge in a city where half of all households are 
very poor, one-fifth live in informal settlements, and one-tenth of residents 
ha:'e no access to water within 200 metres of their homes. The city produced 
evidence that 75 per cent of water delivered to Soweto was unaccounted for 
~nd defended the policy changes as aspects of its attempt to save water and 
mcrease accountability of its use. 
~oth the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with the 
claimants that the 6 kilolitre minimum was unreasonable and set a higher 
standard (although the courts differed on the standard).18 The Constitutional 
~ourt rej~cte~ this approach, holding that "the City is not under a constitu-
tional obhgat10n to provide any particular amount of free water to citizens 
per .month. It is. under a duty to take reasonable measures progressively to 
realize the ach~e~ement of the right." 19 The Court gave three primary 
reasons for declmmg to fix a quantitative standard: setting a fixed standard 
could be counterproductive given that needs vary over time and context·20 
government is institutionally better placed than courts to set standards for 
SER deliv~ry; and it is preferable as a matter of democratic accountability 
that the le?1slature and executive set such standards "for it is their programs 
and promises that are subject to democratic popular choice".21 The Court 
noted, but did not evaluate the parties' conflicting expert evidence on what 
const.itute.d daily "s~~ficie~t water". The Constitutional Court also compared 
the s1~ua~10n of Phm residents with the apparently more dire situation of 
th.as~ m mformal settlements who lack access to a tap providing clean water 
w1thm 200 metres of their home.22 
These reasons reflect the concerns about SER adjudication expressed 
above in~ofar as the?' assume that the elected branches of government are 
b~tter smted to articulate and deliver such rights, and that polycentric 
~1Sputes ma~ leav~ unrepresented absentees greatly affected without their 
mput or cons1derat10n. Would a democratic experimentalist approach, intro-
~uced at bot~ the liability and remedy phases, have assisted in the adjudica-
tion of the nght to water? Or was Mazibuko already an application of the 
democratic experimentalist approach? 
Many aspects of the Court's decision reflect basic tenets of democratic 
experimentalism. Its refusal to set a quantifiable minimum reflects pragmatist 
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anti-essentialism. In celebrating the flexibility of the city's metered user-
pays system for water service delivery above the basic minimum, the' Court 
sanctions the administrative deftness of a market solution. Over the course 
of the litigation, the city itself improved upon its policy, and the Court admit-
ted subsequent evidence of ongoing enhancements including a program 
providing an additional 4 kilolitres of water per month for households that 
register as indigents.23 The Court held that the admission of new evidence 
was justified given the constitutional obligation "to continue to revise its 
policy, consistently with the obligation to ensure progressive realization of 
rights".24 In praising this evolution in the city's position, the judgment 
presented a theory of democracy that united the accountability of the ballot 
box with the ongoing accountability, information disclosure, and responsive-
ness produced directly by litigation. 25 
Nonetheless, Mazibuko also departs from some features of democratic 
experimentalism. The city's flexible, evolving approach to water manage-
ment, praised by the Court, did not result from a direct negotiation between 
the parties or between them and other stakeholders,26 but from what the 
Court saw as the city's own bureaucratic resourcefulness. Provision of addi-
tional water under the city's indigency program was not a tailored policy 
designed in collaboration with and approved by the claimants, who argued 
that it was demeaning and under-inclusive.27 The Court did not give detailed 
consideration to the hardship experienced by households that lost water 
supply after exhaustion of the free basic minimum. As noted. previously, 
many households within Phiri find it difficult to purchase the credits for 
continual supply beyond the FBW amount.28 Despite some soaring rhetoric 
("water is life"29), the Court gave greater credence to problems of water 
scarcity, distribution, and expense, as attested to by the city, than to the 
impact of limited and expensive water on the lived realities of the Phiri 
community. By contrast, the High Court had engaged with the effects of 
insufficient water on a poor community plagued by a high AIDS prevalence 
and paid close attention to the implications of the city's program for the 
applicants' human dignity. 30 
Yet it is possible to reimagine the outcome in Mazibuko through an alterna-
tive approach closer to democratic experimentalism. Rather than adjudicat-
ing between the claimants' and defendants' opposed lines of reasoning, the 'i 
Court would emphasize negotiated elaboration of a new standard of liability 
and new remedial interventions. It would address the conflicts and difficul-
ties associated with water delivery to low-income communities by seeking to 
stimulate new participatory processes for learning, democracy, and experi-
ment. Perhaps a court-supervised negotiation between the parties of the kind 
suggested by Sabel and Simon (2004) might have brought additional insights 
to the problem of managing water sustainably and equitably, central goals 
acknowledged by the Constitutional Court. 31 The Court might have invited 
additional stakeholders, such as residents of informal settlements, commer-
cial water users, sanitation experts, health groups, the South African Human 
246 Sandra Liebenberg and Katharine G. Young 
1 Ri~hts Commission, the Commission for Gender Equality and others, to 
d.ehberate o_ver how ~est to realize the constitutional right of access to suffi. 
cient water m a sustamable and equitable manner. 
Although one cannot predict exactly what would have transpired 
~h~ug~t .exp~riment suggests many possible outcomes. By comparing othe: 
JU:1sdichons m an experimentalist fashion (De Burca et al. 2013), the Court 
might hav: .acknowledged the need for a different minimum standard of 
water prov1s10n ~ased on a clearer articulation of the required purposes and 
~ses of wat~r (Wmkler 2~1~; 126-34; Moya 2013: 80-1, 276-87). By requir-m~ ~he parties to engage m root cause analysis" (which seeks to identify the 
ongmal cause rather than more immediate basis of a problem (Sabel 2005: 
115-16)), the Court might have helped them to broaden their perspectives 
thereby potentially generating novel solutions.32 This might have dissolved 
some powerful, if false, binaries, such as the assumed opposition between 
wat~r consumers and .environmental conservation goals (cf. Kotze 2010). 
W~ile not able to say m the abstract which solutions would be practical or 
elljoy support, one can imagine alternatives that include exploring different 
methods of water distribution and subsidization between various categories 
of water users;33 delivering sanitation through alternative, non-water-borne 
methods such as the provision of newly designed toilets, perhaps acquired 
~hrough a collaboration with private philanthropies; supporting additional 
mfrastr~cture for shared water connections; adding procedural-fairness 
protect10ns. to the p~e-pa~n:ent meter system; replacing the indigency 
program with a less shgmatizmg community insurance policy for water use· 
designing special water programs to support female-headed households and 
those caring for people living with AIDS; or generating efforts to increase 
the livelihood opportunities and incomes of the relevant communities. 
While ~uch solutions are not unique to the experimentalist position, the 
emphasis on c.ourt-s~pervised deliberation, the inclusion of many stakehold-
ers, and the mcenhves for learning and root cause analysis open paths 
toward such innovations. 
The limitless potential of the thought experiment indicates that a robust 
exerc~se in d~mocratic experimentalism eluded the Court's judgment. An 
~xper~mentah.st. response to the Ma:dbuko facts might have stimulated a more 
m.clus1ve participatory process to design a water services policy consistent 
wit~ the normative pu:poses of the right t? water, while enabling the Court 
t~ s1d~step t~e separa~~n-of-_rower~ a~d institutional compet~nce concerns 
cited m the J~dgment. Mazzbuko did httle to solve the underlying causes of 
the water delivery conflict in Phiri. Moreover, by substantially reducing the 
prospects of succes~ in cases involving challenges to the adequacy of govern-
ment pro?~a~ to give .effect to SER, Ma:dbuko arguably had a chilling effect 
on ~E~ htigahon, particularly that involving the enforcement of the positive 
duties imposed by these rights. 
A participatory, experimentalist solution to the Phiri water conflicts could 
have given voice to poor communities affected by the city's policies, 
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constructively channeled the institutional energy of the social movements 
supporting these communities, and avoided the negative jurisprudential 
impact of the judgment. Such an approach would not have required the 
Court to set quantitative standards for water provisioning in an a-contextual, 
rigid and potentially counter-productive manner.35 Yet while compelling 
alternatives responsive to the democratic and separation-of-powers concerns 
described above are possible, their practical likelihood is less convincing. 
Why is this so? We suggest that the limitlessness of theoretical alternatives in 
Mazibuko overlooks a problematic aspect of democratic experimentalis!fi, 
especially in the SER context. Successful application of democratic experi-
mentalism as a pathway to rights fulfillment requires some parity of delibera-
tive strength among the parties, either as peers or because courts or other 
institutions or processes counteract deliberative inequality. This dilemma 
may limit the usefulness of democratic experimentalism in SER adjudication. 
De~m,oc1ratiic e:x:uceri1mE~ntaii1~m: a cri.tia1ue 
Democratic experimentalism offers innovative responses to the concerns 
about SER adjudication identified above. To remove the democratic objec-
tions to judicial review, one weakens the normative finality of judicial 
decisions; just as one counteracts the regulatory inefficiencies of command-
and-control by reducing the finality of decisions by governmental institutions, 
and ayoids the top-down delivery of social goods and services by dispersing 
centralized decision-making. 
The danger in this approach is that localized, bottom-up, deliberative 
processes will not be sufficiently strengthened while the "equalizing" power , .. 
of courts is weakened. This danger is particularly critical in the context of 
SER adjudication as claimants will, by definition, lack the resources for 
effective participation. Often they come to court to access very basic require-
ments of survival. Here we argue that current accounts of democratic 
experimentalism do not adequately address the power imbalances between 
the parties, an omission that deeply compromises the potential of experi-
mentalist adjudication. We pursue three aspects of this criticism: that exper-
imentalism places too much faith in procedural over substantive 
interpretations' of SER while undervaluing the importance of confronta-
tional politics; that it fails to appreciate or address deliberative inequalities; 
and that it overestimates the power of local problem-solving to achieve the 
redistributive aspirations of SER. 
Normati.ve weakness 
Recall that a key feature of experimentalism is the porousness of the bound-
ary it sees between rights enactment and interpretation on the one hand, and 
rights enforcement on the other. The meaning of rights is said to evolve 
through deliberative engagement, processes of benchmarking, rolling 
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standard-setting, and adjustment subject to judicial scrutiny of whether the 
processes conform to experimentalist methodology in broad outlines and 
are sufficiently directed by constitutional considerations. This exposes the 
theory to the critique that its engagement with the normative content of 
rights is too procedural at the cost of substance and too trusting of certain 
deliberative procedures to deliver appropriately on the scope and enforce-
ment of SER. We call this the "normative weakness" objection. The two 
parts to this objection relate to the way in which a strong substantive defini-
tion of rights yields to a procedural articulation of SER, while at the same 
time diminishing certain procedural sources of normative power, such as 
strong courts and oppositional politics. 
Rights are integral to most accounts of democratic experimentalism, but 
their content is not fixed. They are shaped and evolve through pragmatic 
engagement between communities, groups and formal institutions in 
response to particular conflicts and struggles. Over time, rights have become 
a primary means through which the non-foundational, but functionally 
important values of equality and freedom receive institutional and symbolic 
protection in democratic societies (Dorf and Sabel 1998: 444-8). Yet the 
meaning of rights is provisional and open to revision and redefinition 
through democratic deliberation and experimentation in response to vary-
ing local contexts and temporal circumstances (ibid. 445-52). 
Within the practice of adjudication, this conceptualization of rights implies 
deference to processes of democratic decision-making that conform to 
experimentalist criteria and a corresponding avoidance of deep, comprehen-
sive and final definitions of rights. Rarely, and only at the end of an exten-
sive democratic experiment, would a court intervene to substitute a decision 
that it thinks should be made for one made by those directly affected and 
involved (Cohen and Sabel 1997: 337). By then the court is said to have the 
benefit of an extensive record of the deliberative process and the reasoning 
that informed the participatory decisions. 
While this suggests a much weaker role for courts, in the sense that 
substantive rights are not judicially developed and enforced independently 
from the parties' continual involvement (Tushnet 2008: 248), there are 
exceptions. The device of "prophylactic rules" is available to protect urgent 
interests until experimentation produces a 'better solution. Moreover, courts 
can gradually "turn up the heat" of substantive review as democratic exper-
imentation unfolds and emerging standards gain discursive cogency and 
acceptance (Michelman, this volume: 288-9). The aim of f'benchmarking" 
particular rights pronouncements against determinations reached elsewhere 
. can exert this kind of normative pressure. Nonetheless reliance is primarily 
placed on the outcome of ongoing deliberative engagements to develop the 
normative content of rights. These processes do not contemplate that courts 
themselves apply normative standards and values, independently from the 
parties' own expression. But such standards and values are the outcomes of 
hard-won domestic and/ or international struggles to carve out the normative 
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content of SER. The worry is that such gains may be negotiated away by 
subjecting them to ongoing processes of democratic experimentation in 
which outcomes may reflect the power disparities between the parties rather 
than the evolving normative standards associated with SER. 
Even benchmarking processes - which democratic experimentalists favor 
as an ever-increasing standard of review when standards reached earlier, or 
elsewhere, are internalized as minimal commitments (Dorf and Sabel 1998: 
339) - may succeed when applying SER determinations developed in courts 
or jurisdictions that do not practise democratic experimentalism because the 
stronger, substantive SER approaches may be grounded in a very different 
mode of adjudication or other politics. This relates to the second feature of 
the normative weakness objection: experimentalism downplays the conten-
tious cultural and political processes through which rights often acquire 
meaning. 36 Processes that privilege an atmosphere of negotiated resolutions 
and that, beyond a certain point, discourage parties from holding robust, 
partisan or counter-hegemonic views tend to deny or suppress basic cultural 
and distributional conflicts. 
From a perspective in which rights accrue normative strength by connect-
ing abstract values to specific meanings through social struggles, democratic 
experimentalism seems to ignore the potential contributions of spontaneous, 
not fully deliberative and possibly confrontational political action and 
expression. Young has described this as a "symbolic deficit" of experimen-
talism, contrasting the "grand, world-shifting discourse" of other, jurisgen-
erative accounts of rights with the "pragmatist, problem-solving and 
incremental reform" orientation of experimentalism (Young 2012: 284). 
Similarly, scholars such as De Sousa Santos anl Rodriguez-Garavito criti-
cize the tendency of democratic experimentalism to exclude contentious 
collective action, which may be a political requisite for the attainment of 
social and legal transformations (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito 
2005: 8, 16). 
Current democratic experimentalism theories tell us little of how the 
normative strength that attaches to rights after social struggle - often after 
exceptional moments of crisis - is generated and sustained in experimental-
ist processes (Herschkoff and Kingsbury 2003: 321). Many accounts of the 
historical processes undergirding the emergence of human rights emphasize 
· the political energy generated in crisis as critical to the formulation and 
ongoing resilience of rights (e.g., Dudziak 2011: 236, Forbath 2001: 1828-9). 
Clearly, periods of incremental or repressed advocacy and struggle are also 
important, as South Africa's own long fight against apartheid demonstrates. 
But rights commitments are heightened, rearticulated, and become embed-
ded in new settlements after an energetic moment of crisis .. The Second 
World War provides a good example in the context of SER (Young 2009: 
181-91). When the crisis ceases, something is needed to protect unrepre-
sented and marginalized groups in public reform processes, whether strong 
narratives of rights, strong memories of struggle, strong courts, strong central 
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governments, strbng social movements or other sources of power. Democratic 
experimentalism does not contest this historical account. 
?ur "".'orry is that proph~la~tic rules, benchmarking, and painstaking 
deliberative engagements w1thm the strictures imposed by democratic 
experimentalism may not be enough to safeguard rights claimants, particu-
larly those who do not enjoy broad popular support in disputes which are 
polarizing and accompanied by structural power-conflicts. This problem 
may. be com.fllon to all prescriptions for weaker courts (e.g., Tushnet 2008), 
but it does represent a major concern that the democratic experimentalist 
response to· the concerns raised by SER adjudication fails to appreciate a 
vital aspect of how the normative strength of rights is built. 
In Mazibuko, the Phiri claimants and their social movement supporters 
turned to courts when mobilization and social protest failed to redress their 
concerns. One reason their mobilization strategy failed was that the claim-
ants lacked the broad cross-class and cultural support needed to initiate the 
deep-seated and long-term institutional reforms needed to secure access to 
water (Dugard 2008b: 595-6). The government spearheaded reform efforts 
concerning water (Klug forthcoming) without much prior, focused organiz-
ing by social movements. We speculate that this backdrop diminished the 
organizing strength of the Phiri claimants and made it more difficult for them 
to build the kind of cross-class alliances forged by the Treatment Action 
Campaign in their popularized campaigns on the right to health care (Young 
and Lemaitre 2013: 203-6). Now, three years after the Constitutional Court 
decision, the Anti-Privatization Forum, one of the major social movements 
involved in the litigation, no longer exists, which heightens the vulnerability 
of the Phiri community. Dugard and Langford identify certain material and 
symbolic gains that flowed from the litigation. Material gains included the 
increase in the FBW allocation for indigent and special needs households, 
the installation of a "trickler" device on the pre-payment meters to avoid the 
automatic termination of access to water following the exhaustion of 
the FBW allocation, and an undertaking from the city not to prosecute 
anyone for bypassing the pre-payment meters (Dugard and Langford 2011: 
58-9). The symbolic gains included the establishment of a new coalition, the 
Coalition Against Water Privatization (CAWP), and dissemination of public-
ity and information concerning water rights, water services related planning, 
budgeting and o.ther problems (ibid.). Nonetheless, these indirect gains 
remain problematic and insecure as they are not grounded in a clear articu-
lation of the city's constitutional responsibilities in terms of section 27. 
Registration for the increased package is vastly under-representative of 
qualifying households, and access to sufficient water for the majority of 
impoverished households living in Phiri remains a major concern. 37 This 
outcome suggests that the deep disadvantage experienced by impoverished 
and politically marginalized groups involved in the Phiri litigation called for 
the enhanced protection of a strong normative statement by the Court of the 
values, objectives and obligations generated by section 27. 
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Instead, the Constitutional Court's judgment engaged very little with the 
constitutional values and purposes of the right of access to sufficient water. 
Almost no reference was made to relevant international or comparative 
law pertaining to the right to water (described, e.g., by Winkler 2012). The 
critical question is whether deliberation in a democratic experimentalist 
mode would have facilitated a more in-depth normative engagement with 
section 27 and a stronger account of the normative purposes underlying 
the right. 
Deliberative m~~qi1aLrtlt~s 
To the normative weakness objection must be added the concern, acknowl-
edged by it_s proponents, that many central tenets of democratic experimen-
talism contain built-in structural biases that systematically advantage the 
strong and disadvantage the weak. 38 In addition to neutralizing the levelling 
effects of either strong courts and/ or contentious politics, such features 
include the decentralization of authority and the privileging of deliberative 
reasoning as a mode of solving social problems.39 The predictable inequality 
between the parties in SER adjudication affects both the bargaining strength 
and the I!_l.Ore general ability of deliberative processes to create agency on 
the part of the poor. 
As early propon~nts of democratic experimentalism acknowledged, two 
forms of inequality may operate to disadvantage weaker parties in delibera-
tive processes: a "bargaining disadvantage" of inequality and a "disenfran-
chisement effect" (Dorf and Sabel 1998: 409). The former argues that 
resource maldistributions undermine the ability of "the have-nots" to 
successfully assert and defend their interests in contentious negotiations, 
while the "haves" are able to "recoup losses they might unaccountably suffer 
in one round of bargaining in the next" (ibid. 1998: 408-9). Poor claimants 
are also disadvantaged in bargaining processes because they are less able to 
predict their own bargaining strengths and are more likely to be exploited 
in settlement procedures (Fiss 1984: 1076). A "disenfranchisement effect" 
occurs in that the very experience . of oppression and grinding poverty 
removes from the impoverished the ability to participate successfully in 
deliberative processes, and to take advantage of the opportunities presented. 
Democratic experimentalist proponents Dorf and Sabel do not contest 
that resource inequalities create bargaining disadvantages. However, they 
reject the idea that the only possible outcome is mechanical reproduction of 
inequality. They argue that the historical record and the reality of practical · 
politics is far more complex and that the disadvantaged have real opportuni-
ties to extract gains through alliances with divided factions of the elite, . 
particularly under conditions of uncertainty and volatility that inequality 
helps to perpetuate (Dorf and Sabel 1998: 409-10). They also theorize that 
dialogue and engagement have a transformative power on persons' self-
understandings and prior commitments (ibid. 467). 
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The.second, "disenfranchisement" effect of inequality is a greater obstacle. 
But as Dorf and Sabel suggest, if inequality inevitably creates disenfranchise-
ment, then it would systematically undermine all radically redistributive 
reform iJ1itiatives, as oppressed groups would be divided and incapable of 
ge.ner~tirig .the solidarity needed to formulate radical proposals for change. 
H1stoncal mstances of oppression reveal the opposite - that oppressed 
groups are eminently capable of organizing, exercising agency, rebelling and. 
negotiating to bring about social change (ibid. 410-1). Nonetheless, that 
historical record is also replete with confrontational, oppositional politics of 
a kind disfavored by the democratic experimentalist approach. 
Indeed, one might fear that experimentalism may risk serious co-optation 
effects that lead disadvantaged participants to adapt to an unjust social order 
in th~ ~nterests of arriving at pragmatic solutions and invite them to exchange 
a politics of defiance and "limit breaking" for a politics of "small deals" (ibid. 
41~). Just as noted above in relation to the normative weakness objection, 
this exchange undercuts the symbolic and mobilizing potency of the politics 
of resistance, which arguably has greater potential to redress deliberative 
inequalities than attempting to reconcile vastly divergent interests through 
painstaking incremental negotiations. In the Mazibuko context, social move-
ments such as the Anti-Privatization Forum might have lost what limited 
bargaining power they had; had they abstained from contentious political 
mobilization and protest in order to operate within the strictures of a demo-
cratic experimentalist negotiation. 
Deliberative inequalities structure outcomes in more subtle ways as well. 
The personality new governance envisions - "pragmatic, democratic, collab-
orative negotiators" - shapes and constrains the way disadvantaged groups 
are able to advance their interests (Cohen 2008: 539). The skills required for 
successful deliberation "are purposefully designed to shape individual inter-
ests in ways which are strategically adaptive to existing social and power 
relations" (ibid. 540). Experimentalism steers participants to seek collabora-
tive solutions that accommodate market efficiency concerns (typically to be 
the credo of the more economically powerful) and concerns about inequality 
~nd lack of access to resources (the concerns of the economically marginal-
ized). The logic is that win-win solutions are possible and that economic 
efficiency and democratic legitimacy are mutually reinforcing (Cohen 2008 
citing Lobel 2004: 344; Rose 2006). This optimism about win-win solutions 
must be tempered by a greater realism that negotiation processes frequently 
produce winners and losers (Cohen 2008: 546) and may end by reproducing 
rather than altering the status quo (De Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito 
2005: 6-9; Scheuerman 2004: 125-6). 
. The risk is exacerbated in conditions of social and economic inequality as 
d1sempowered groups can end up compromising on positions that would be 
in their distributional interests in exchange for the recognition benefits of 
participating in processes perceived as procedurally fair and dignity-
enhancing (Cohen 2008: 542; De Burca et al 2013: 59). In short, the vision of 
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the "selves" underlying democratic experimentalism - open and willing to be 
transformed through dialogic engagement with the other, and to convert their 
ends into:strategic interests so as to achieve pragmatic solutions - is, as Cohen 
argues, already heavily inflected by practices of power (Cohen 2008: 530). 
Tbeli.mits 
To these criticisms of normative wea~ess and deliberative inequalities we 
add a third: the bias toward-local decision-making in democratic experimen-
talism might further detracts from the redistributive aspirations of SER. Not 
dispersed forms of local problem-solving, but a national-scale redistribution 
of resources, services and opportunities may be needed before experimental-
ist methods can meaningfully be contemplated. A preference for the local 
can create a built-in head wind against centrally coordinated projects aimed 
at advancing egalitarian distribution of resources. For example, the inade-
quacy of resources and political support for anti-poverty proposals in both 
the United States and South Africa has been cited as a failure of localism: 
"decentralization places responsibility on government actors that lack the 
fiscal capacity to respond effectively" (Super 2008: 547; see also, in the South 
African context, Siddle and Koelble 2012: 184-5). Critics claim that demo-
cratic experimentalism assumes away problems that necessitate national 
regulation. These include the way in which externalities from one state or 
locality, such as pollution or migration, affect another (Super 2008: 557). 
The democratic experimentalist solution to the conundrum of centralization -
to benchmark and scale up from successful experiments - creates its own chal-
lenges. , These include the difficulty of measuring success, as well as the 
institutional will and capacity among various spheres of government, private 
actors, and social movements to engage in a benchmarking exercise, agree on 
best practices, and make consequential adjustments in policy and practice. 
This criticism raises complex issues beyond the scope of this chapter. For 
example, while there is evidence of successful SER benchmarking between 
provinces in South Africa, 40 there is equally evidence that decentralization can 
lead to differences in quantity and quality of services provided in different 
areas within a state, depending on the capacity and resources of the relevant 
local unit. This may lead to a deepening of inequalities between richer and 
poorer areas.41 
From a different perspective, the preference for localism may discount the 
important advantage for SER claimants of utilizing international human 
rights standards. These emerged through national and international strug-
gles and provide valuable normative markers for evaluating both the 
processes '!lP.d outcomes of deliberative engagement. For example, interna-
tional standards of adequacy, access (physical and economic), acceptability, 
and adaptability have emerged as guides in assessing the fulfilment of SER, 
without commitment to a precise political program or policy blueprint. 
These broad standards leave much scope for their practical implications to 
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be contested and worked out through various forms of institutional and 
extra~institutional politics. Unlike the localized, participatory processes 
favored by democratic experimentalism, their pedigree is often an expert-
led, "top-down" crafting w.:ithout the responsiveness of local processes (despite suggestions of more participatory processes in more resent interna-
tional treaty-making and standard setting and in regional institutions: see De 
Burca et al. 2013: 26-38; Gerstenberg 2012: 904). Yet these deficiencies in 
local responsiveness and deliberation do not inevitably obstruct the poten-
tial of international standards to guide SER adjudication. 
As a species of deliberative response to concerns about SER adjudication, 
democratic experimentalism has clear institutional virtues. It promotes 
bottom-up, collaborative decision-making by those directly affected by 
social problems and injustice instead of the imposition of top-down solutions 
by the remote and inflexible central institutions of representative democ-
racy. It enhances accountability and learning through the requirements of 
deliberative reason. And it attempts to create new institutional spaces for 
citizens to design innovative solutions to collective problems, solutions 
currently beyond the imagination of the orthodox institutions of liberal 
constitutional democracies. 
Yet, we have sought to demonstrate that many design features of demo-
cratic experimentalism suggest a misplaced optimism in the equalizing 
power of deliberation and the likelihood of achieving common ground in the 
situations of intense distributional conflict that characterize many SER 
disputes. The very values that animate democratic experimentalism generate 
tools for criticizing its use in an array of social contexts. The turn to proce-
dural forms of SER definition and enforcement can undercut the normative 
strength that social and economic rights potentially off er those marginalized 
by poverty and inequality. Democratic experimentalism relies on strong 
forms of political organization while removing the grounds of oppositional, 
contentious politics on which social movements often depend. Of particular 
concern is the way in which experimentalist processes discount power asym-
metries and place the risks of a local, deliberative process of detision-making 
on the weaker party. 
These limitations do not to our minds imply a wholesale rejection of 
democratic experimentalism, but rather demand closer study of the condi-
tions under which it may empower participants and advance substantive 
SER goals. Democratic experimentalism should not be viewed as a complete 
prescription for social change, but as one set of institutional ar~:angements 
that may be more or less suited to generating progressive changes in various 
contexts. It can form part of an eclectic range of tactics for social move-
ments, marginalized communities and other forms of social organization, 
and for courts in the design of review and remedies. We have highlighted 
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some weaknesses in order to enable a more clear-eyed assessment of when 
it is likely to be productive for courts, governments and disadvantaged 
groups to participate in experimentalist processes. 
This conclusion is significant not only in answering the question with 
which we started- can democratic experimentalism help to address the chal-
lenges of SER adjudication? - but also to our thinking about the role of 
social and economic rights in democracy in general. Many of the problems 
that beset democratic experimentalism are common to other deliberative 
models of rights enforcement, where equalizing inequality is both a precon-
dition for getting started and an end goal. The problems that we have identi-
fied in the course of our Mardbuko thought experiment - such as bargaining 
disadvantages, disenfranchisement effects, adaptive preferences, the elusive-
ness of the win-win, externalities, co-optation by offer of half-a-loaf, and the 
inevitability of distributive conflict - apply to other deliberative models of 
democratic engagement and challenge us to interrogate our conception of 
democracy more deeply. 
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